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updates from the regional human rights systems
European Court of Human
Rights
Indefinite Retention of
DNA Samples Violates the Right
to Privacy
The Grand Chamber decided unanimously in S. and Marper v. the U.K. that
there are limits on the use of modern technologies in criminal justice systems. The
U.K. government set out on a path to build
an extensive database of DNA samples,
DNA profiles and fingerprints in order to
fight crime more effectively. According
to the Criminal Justice and Police Act of
2001, the police had a right to collect, and
retain indefinitely, fingerprints and DNA
samples from anybody under investigation. At the time of the December 4, 2008
judgment, the government had the DNA
profiles of 4.5 million persons on file.
The government kept DNA profiles
from both petitioners in the case, even
though criminal investigations were eventually terminated. S., a juvenile, was
charged with attempted robbery but was
acquitted on trial. Marper was charged
with harassment but reconciled with his
partner, and charges were not pressed.
They both unsuccessfully applied for their
private data to be destroyed. The U.K.’s
highest court decided that mere retention
of fingerprints and DNA samples did not
constitute an interference with the right to
privacy.
The European Court disagreed, and
pointed to the highly personal nature of
DNA samples, which contained sensitive
information about an individual. The same
applied to DNA profiles from which information such as a person’s ethnic origin
can be determined, as well as fingerprints
which allow precise identification of a
person. Consequently, simple storing of
such data must be justified in terms of
paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
The crux of the case laid in balancing
the petitioners’ privacy interests with the
state’s legitimate goal of preventing crime.
The outcome of the case was practically

decided when the Court stated that the
margin of appreciation, that is a degree of
deference accorded to national authorities,
in this case was narrow because of the
fundamental importance of the protection
of personal data for enjoyment of private
life. It also relied on the common standard
among European states, none of which
allowed for indefinite retention of this type
of data regardless of the seriousness of
the crime. Framing the issue in this way,
the Court had no problem declaring that
the blanket and indiscriminate nature of
the data retention powers struck an unfair
balance between the competing public and
private interests, and therefore violated
Article 8 of the Convention.
The Court may have too quickly dismissed the U.K.’s argument that comparisons with other European countries were
not of much relevance because the U.K. has
led the vanguard in developing the use of
DNA samples to detect crime. Yet potentially, the most important pronouncement
in the case was that “any [s]tate claiming
a pioneer role in the development of new
technologies bears special responsibility
for striking the right balance [between
competing public and private interests].”
The Court thus put a heavy burden of proof
on pioneering states. The U.K. government
responded to the judgment by announcing
plans to vary the timescale of retaining
DNA evidence based on the seriousness
of the offense, and possibly the age of and
risk posed by the individual.

States Must Fight Internet
Crime Effectively
The Court explored the limits of anonymity on the internet in K.U. v. Finland.
The case involved an advertisement of a
sexual nature featuring a 12 year old boy
on an internet dating site. The father of the
boy asked the police to identify the person
in order to bring charges. Despite the fact
that the posting of the ad was a crime,
the service provider refused to disclose
information about the perpetrator, as it
considered itself bound by the confidentiality of telecommunications as provided by
Finnish law. The boy claimed in his appli45

cation to the Court that his private life was
affected by the advertisement and that the
state did not effectively protect him by not
being able to prosecute the perpetrators.
It is no longer disputed that under the
European Convention on Human Rights
there are positive obligations for states
arising from effective protection of private
life of its inhabitants. This includes an obligation to protect persons under the state’s
jurisdiction from interferences into private
life by third parties.
As the government demonstrated that
other remedies were available to the applicant, such as civil damages from the service provider, the crucial question was
whether the incident required a criminal
response. The government argued that the
advertisement was a minor crime and so it
had the authority to give precedence to free
speech and anonymity on the internet.
The Court disagreed in a unanimous
decision on December 2, 2008. Even
though states are free to choose the means
by which to ensure respect for private
life, grave interferences require an effective response. Considering the applicant’s
young age and vulnerability, the Court
stressed the seriousness of the offense,
which constituted a potential threat to his
physical and mental welfare. The Convention requires states to implement a system
that effectively deters the sexual abuse of
children because of the abhorrence of such
a wrongdoing. Even though the posting of
such an ad was a crime, its deterrent effect
was seriously reduced by the legislation
that made it practically impossible for the
police to identify the perpetrator. Thus, the
Finnish legislation violated Article 8 of the
Convention by protecting the anonymity of
internet users in such cases.
The Court acknowledged that freedom
of speech and protection of privacy of internet users is important, but not absolute. It
must yield on occasion to other legitimate
imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder and crime, or the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. The Court
apparently had little sympathy with such
an exercise of freedom of speech, which it
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described as reprehensible. The judgment
serves as an important guidance for states
trying to balance the privacy of internet
users with other legitimate aims.

States Free to Restrict Wearing of
Religious Symbols
The Grand Chamber of the Court upheld
a ban on headscarves at Turkish universities in Leyla Sahin v. Turkey. In the 2005
opinion, the majority ruled that such a
ban violated neither the right to freedom
of religion nor the right to education of
the students. The judgment was widely
criticized as being too deferential to the
state. A blanket ban aimed at defending
the secularity of the state and protection of
women from external pressures seemed to
be disproportionate in the case of mature
university students. In the subsequent case
of Köse and Others v. Turkey, the Court
similarly held that a ban on wearing headscarves at secondary schools did not violate the European Convention on Human
Rights because it protected adolescents at
an impressionable age. In a series of cases
in the autumn of 2008 against France, the
Court confirmed its strong deference to
states regarding restrictions on wearing
religious symbols.
In the identical cases of Dogru v.
France and Kervanci v. France, the Court
indirectly examined the French legislation
that prohibits wearing religious symbols in
all primary and secondary public schools.
The applicants were 11 and 12 year old
children who were expelled from school
because they repeatedly refused to take
off their headscarves in physical education
classes. On December 4, 2008, the Court
found that such an interference with their
freedom of religion did not overstep the
margin of appreciation of the state.
In view of the young age of the applicants and the need to protect them and
other children from external pressures,
the outcome of the judgment seems to be
correct. Yet, the Court’s heavy reliance on
the protection of secularism as a justification for the ban is troubling. Without more
careful scrutiny into whether the measures
in question were really necessary, and
a clear elaboration of what secularism
means, there is a risk of states placing
overly broad restrictions on the freedom of
religion in the name of secularism.

The Court’s unwillingness to scrutinize more closely restrictions on wearing
religious symbols is exemplified by the
Court’s decision in Mann Singh v. France
on November 13, 2008. Mr. Singh, a
practicing Sikh, refused to take off his
turban for his driver’s license photograph
as required by a 2004 law. All his previous
driver’s license pictures showed him in a
turban. The Court found the application
inadmissible. It ruled that such an interference with his freedom of religion was justified because bareheaded photographs were
needed by the authorities in charge of public safety and law and order, particularly in
the context of checks carried out under the
road traffic regulations.
To dismiss the case as manifestly illfounded in one paragraph seems to be
too superficial. Many questions were left
unanswered, such as whether a photograph
without a turban would really be more
effective, as such an individual would
likely be wearing one when stopped by
police. Why is a bareheaded picture so
necessary now when it was not in the past?
These are certainly issues that deserved a
careful consideration at the merits stage.
As demonstrated by these cases, the
Court’s position seems to be that unless
manifestly unreasonable or disproportionate, states enjoy considerable leeway in
restricting the public exercise of religion.

Inter-American System
IACHR Demands the Protection of
Human Rights Defenders in Valle
Jaramillo and others v. Colombia
On November 27, 2008 the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (Court)
decided the case of Valle Jaramillo and
others v. Colombia. In that decision, the
Court’s finding of violations of a number
of rights in the American Convention on
Human Rights (Convention) in relation
to the 1998 murder of a prominent human
rights defender served as a stern warning to Colombia to take the protection
of human rights defenders seriously. The
decision comes amidst a flurry of international attention critiquing Colombia’s poor
human rights record.
Valle Jaramillo was killed in February 1998 when anonymous gunmen broke
into his office and shot him in the head.
Some of his family members were forcibly
46

detained and threatened during the attack
and suffered intimidation for many years
afterward. Prior to his death, Valle Jaramillo spoke out against the criminal activities of paramilitary and security forces in
Antioquia Department, which at that time
was governed by current Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. According to the Commission, the execution of Valle Jaramillo
was not an isolated incident, but occurred
within a context of systematic persecution
of human rights defenders and a general
lack of protective measures and safeguards.
In the decade since the incident, Colombia
sentenced three civilians in absentia but
failed to initiate a criminal investigation
into the responsibility of security forces.
The incident carries significant political
relevance in light of allegations by local
media that Uribe was complicit in opposition massacres in Antioquia while he
served as governor.
The Court considered alleged violations
of the rights to life (Article 4), humane
treatment and personal integrity (Article
5), personal liberty (Article 7), a fair trial
(Article 8), honor and dignity (Article 11),
freedom of thought and expression (Article
13), protection of the family (Article 17),
freedom of movement and residence (Article 22), and judicial protection (Article
25), in regards to Valle Jaramillo and his
family members. The state of Colombia
issued a partial admission of responsibility
for some of the alleged violations, recognizing that it had failed to fulfill its duty
to guarantee many of the rights allegedly
violated. Despite accepting this partial
admission, the Court exercised its discretion to make a determination on the merits
of the case.
The Court found that the state violated
the rights of Valle Jaramillo and his family, including some rights beyond the scope
of Colombia’s admission. In particular,
Colombia violated Valle Jaramillo’s rights
to personal liberty, personal integrity, and
life by failing to fulfill its responsibility
to protect human rights defenders in the
face of real, immediate, and avoidable
risk. In addition, and beyond the scope
of the state’s admission, the Court found
that the State violated Valle Jaramillo’s
family members’ rights to freedom of
movement because they were forced to
live outside their home country due to fear
of persecution. Furthermore, the Court
found a violation of judicial protections
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and fair trial rights of the family members
because the investigation and prosecutions
were ineffective. The prolonged period of
proceedings resulted in convictions of only
three civilians who were not even within
the custody of Colombian authorities, and
consequently, were not serving any sentence. The Court awarded compensatory
damages of around $215,000 USD and
demanded that the state ensure the security
of family members and conduct an expedient investigation into state responsibility
for the murder.

Court Rebuffs Venezuelan
Judicial Ethics, and Venezuela
Rejects the Ruling
The Court issued judgment in the matter of Apitz Barbera et al v. Venezuela on
August 5, 2008. The judgment surrounded
a controversial action taken by a Venezuelan court in October 2003. At that time,
a disciplinary body removed three judges
from Venezuela’s First Court of Administrative Disputes for the allegedly erroneous granting of an amparo remedy, or a
protection of a constitutional right, against
an administrative act. The disempowered
judges contended that their dismissal was
motivated by ideology and that they were
denied access to the procedures through
which they could effectively contest their
removal. They alleged that Venezuela
had not sufficiently informed them of the
grounds for dismissal, had not provided
access to a hearing by a competent and
impartial tribunal, and had not protected
their due process guarantees.
The Venezuelan government established the disciplinary body that removed
the judges during the 1999 constitutional
transition and the adoption into force of the
Bolivarian Constitution. With jurisdiction
over administrative issues, the First Court
ruled unanimously to grant a precautionary application for protection from an
administrative act, and was charged by the
disciplinary body with having committed
an inexcusable judicial error. Accordingly,
the sanction of removal was imposed upon
the entire bench of that case. Two of the
judges brought challenges to their dismissal
based on lack of jurisdiction and an appeal
for a constitutional protection and annulment. The amparo protection was denied
to the two judges, and the annulment had
not yet been reviewed on the merits. The
judges subsequently brought the case to

the Inter-American Commission, where it
progressed to the Inter-American Court.
The Court found that Venezuela had not
secured the rights of the judges to impartial
hearings and to knowledge of the grounds
for their dismissal. The Court also found
that, with regard to the two judges who
had attempted domestic proceedings, the
State violated the right to be heard within
a reasonable time and the right to effective
recourse. The Court ordered that Venezuela reinstate the three judges into positions
of equivalent stature and that it ensure the
expeditious passage of a national code of
judicial ethics.
Although the Court’s decision made a
strong statement on the importance of judicial ethics, the Venezuelan Supreme Court
officially rejected the ruling. The Supreme
Court accused the Inter-American Court of
usurping the State’s powers and of unacceptably intervening in domestic proceedings. According to the Supreme Court,
undermining the firmness of the decisions
against the ex-judges could lead to institutional chaos. Amnesty International has
said that the Supreme Court’s ruling sends
a dangerous message that human rights
are optional. It remains unclear if or when
the Inter-American Court will exercise its
mandate to monitor compliance with the
judgment.

Court Emphasizes State’s
Duty to Investigate in Tiu Tojin
v. Guatemala
In its decision of November 26, 2008
in the case of Tiu Tojin v. Guatemala, the
Court reinforced the responsibility of states
to investigate crimes and end impunity.
The case concerned the forced disappearance of Maria Tiu Tojin and her daughter,
Josefa, which took place in 1990 as part of
a systemic conflict between military forces
and Mayan indigenous communities. The
Court held that Guatemala violated the
rights of Tiu Tojin, including the rights to
life (Article 4), humane treatment (Article
5), personal liberty (Article 7), fair trial
(Article 8) and judicial protection (Article
25). Additionally, the Court found that
Guatemala violated the rights of children
(Article 19) with regards to Tiu Tojin’s
daughter, and breached its legal responsibilities of fair process and judicial protection in relation to Tiu Tojin’s other family
members.
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The state of Guatemala displayed a
positive and cooperative attitude towards
the case and officially recognized its international responsibility for violating each
of the rights alleged. The Court noted that
Guatemala formally apologized, erected a
monument in memory of Tiu Tojin, issued
compensation to relatives, and reimbursed
costs associated with the proceedings at the
Commission level.
Notwithstanding the state’s positive
contribution, however, the Court proceeded to make a determination of the facts
of the disappearance. The Court found that
the arrest and disappearance of Tiu Tojin
and her daughter were motivated by their
indigenous Mayan identity. As a result
of the internal armed conflict which took
place from 1962 through 1996, displaced
Mayan families, including Tiu Tojin and
her daughter, were forced into the mountains where many were later arrested and
detained by state security forces. Some
were transferred to displaced-person
camps, but many were disappeared in this
process for suspected guerilla involvement. The specific fate of Tiu Tojin and
her daughter is unclear.
Following this determination of the truth
of the situation, the Court highlighted that
the investigation and prosecution of those
responsible was severely prolonged; no
significant progress was made in over sixteen years. Although Guatemala asserted
that the complexity of the case, rather
than inaction or unwillingness, caused this
delay, the Court emphasized the legal
obligations of Guatemala to combat impunity despite the difficulties in investigating these complicated crimes. The Court
ordered Guatemala to not only investigate
the events that led to the violations and to
identify and prosecute those responsible,
but also to conduct a search for the persons
or remains of Tiu Tojin and her daughter.
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